“New-Breed” Leadership, Conflict, and Reconstruction in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: A Sociopolitical Biography of Uganda’s Yoweri Kaguta Museveni
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Although now a largely discredited idea, the notion that the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s generated a new breed of African leadership captured popular imagination, official discourse, and academic writing. Leaders like Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia, Isias Aferworki in Eritrea, and Paul Kagame in Rwanda were young, dynamic, and willing to break discredited predecessors’ taboos. Among this brethren, no personality better exemplified the “new” breed than Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda. When the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) assumed power in the wake of Uganda’s second civil war in the 1980s, the leadership of the Movement very quickly assumed an almost Guevaran posture in the discourse on African democratization and recovery. Nearly two decades later, Museveni still dominates Uganda’s popular and intellectual imagination, but in many respects is beginning to look more and more like a scion of the old breed.

The new generation of African leaders—in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Rwanda, Congo and South Africa—have many of them been legitimized by the armed liberation struggle against foreign occupiers or discredited regimes. But they are a pragmatic breed, managers rather than prophets, often successfully combining free-market economies with a single-party system. . . . The new leaders have a natural affinity for Anglo-Saxon culture and business and are more directly attuned to globalization.

—Leymarie 1997:2, emphasis added
Introduction

Considerable debate and commentary has been generated in the popular press, by foreign policy and International Relations analysts and pundits as well as among scholarly commentators on African politics of the late 1980s and early 1990s, by the arrival of what looked like a new breed of African leader. Those descriptions coincided with optimism about the new wave of democratization that was believed to have swept the continent and witnessed the crumbling of several single-party states and military dictatorships (Osaghae 1999).

Accounts written at the time show that observers believed a nirvana in African leadership had indeed truly arrived. According to those accounts, whose themes continue in contemporary discourse on Africa, the new breed had forever banished the archaic and exclusionary modes of governance, corruption and economic mismanagement, and the manifestly discriminatory and marginalizing methods employed by leaders of the past. Depicted as Davids who struck down gerontocratic and monolithic Goliaths, the members of the new breed were generally young, dynamic, determined, no-nonsense, development-minded, and progressive. To borrow an American expression, they were "sexy." This description revealed only part of the truth.

Who exactly were the new breed? and why were they so named? How much did these leaders actually change the traditional modes of leadership and governance that they overthrew, and how much did the business of African leadership continue as usual? Most importantly for our purposes, how committed were they to the genuine and peaceful resolution of the conflicts that they confronted domestically, and to the regional conflicts that developed during the nearly two decades of their tenure in office? Finally, what prospect does the future hold for countries that have experienced this brand of leadership, and for the resolution of conflicts within and between them?

This essay attempts to answer some of these questions. It does so, first, by looking at who comprises the new breed, and offers some explanations of how Africanist scholarship—fixated as it is with the bigman syndrome—and popular discourse adopted this characterization of the leadership. Then, it focuses on Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Uganda’s president since 1986 and, the leader in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa to whom the term new breed is most regularly applied. In looking at Museveni, I wish to illuminate the aspects of his leadership that have marked a genuine departure from that of his predecessors, and to highlight the elements of continuity with past modes of governance that have been manifested and indeed entrenched over the course of the period under examination. These tendencies have heightened the tensions and apprehensions that provide considerable fodder for the generation and continuation of armed conflict in the region.

Geographically and politically, Uganda stands at the epicenter of the current conflicts that plague the region. In this sense, Uganda represents a
veritable paradox—a relatively poor and traditionally weak regional power afflicted by serious internal conflicts, and yet one that has been able to become actively involved in perhaps all the major conflicts of the GLR, even extending to those in the Greater Horn, the Sudan being a prime example. At the same time, Uganda’s president has managed to retain his prominent and significant ranking within the pantheon of the new breed of leaders, despite his less luminous reputation as a regional troublemaker and Bismarck-like expansionist (Mujaju 1997). In the last section of the essay, I specifically consider the issue of conflict and review some of the causes that are traceable to this new-breed style of leadership, against a broader contextualization of the phenomenon. I offer some pointers on the manner in which I believe that contemporary leadership politics is likely to influence conflict and its continuation or amelioration in the GLR.

Throughout the essay, we are keenly aware that political biography is an arena of scholarship that is itself fraught with potential for conflicting interpretation, particularly if the main protagonist of the story has not yet passed on into history, and continues to occupy such a prominent and contentious position in 21st century African politics. Such is the case with the persona of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni.

**Who Were the New Breed?**

The official story is that the new breed were a product of the gross mismanagement and bad governance that characterized the first two decades of African leadership. Spurred on mainly by the political and social upheavals they inherited, these new leaders comprised a motley collection of presidents whose stated vision for their individual countries marked a radical departure from past leadership methods. Most of them came to power via a guerrilla movement organized in armed combat against an incumbent regime, or through an electoral process that heralded the introduction of multiparty politics for the first time in several years (Ottaway 1999). Collectively, they presented a stark contrast to the bigman syndrome that had characterized much of the mode of leadership that African countries experienced from the early postcolonial period. They shared the newness of their arrival on the scene, a style of leadership, and the radical character of the reforms they envisaged for the transformation of the manner of “doing politics” in their individual countries. They held similar views on how politics should be done in the wider pan-African context and beyond. All were held in high esteem by Western intellectuals, media, and governmental and intelligence circles, and in particular by Bill Clinton, the U.S. president in power through most of the 1990s. Indeed, as one observer has pointed out, there was a certain “irrational exuberance” in the U.S. administration’s attitude towards this new crop of African leaders (Rosenblum 2002:195).

At the same time, there was a manifest degree of arbitrariness to the manner of application of the new breed categorization. A survey of the
scholarly literature and of several popular accounts of recent African politics reveals that the new breed could be loosely described to include South Africa’s Nelson Mandela (and his successor, Thabo Mbeki), but excluded Sam Nujoma of Namibia, respectively elected in 1994 and 1990. It included Ethiopian premier Meles Zenawi, but excluded Tanzanian president Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who came to power in 1985 (and even his successor, Benjamin Mkapa who was elected in 1995). It included Isias Afwerwoki, the Eritrean leader who negotiated the “amicable” divorce from Ethiopia in 1993, after decades of civil war, and it even extended to Jerry J. Rawlings of Ghana, often considered a member of the ‘club’ despite having been in power for several years before the others. Strangely, it did not include Zambian president Frederick Chiluba—a trade unionist who, in 1991, on a wave of general economic malaise and popular discontent with one-party rule, succeeded Kenneth Kaunda; nor did it include Malawian president Bakili Muluzi, who came to power in 1993, after the deposition of one of Africa’s longest-serving presidents, Hastings Kamuzu Banda.

In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the title new breed was generically applied to the leadership of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), but more specifically to Paul Kagame—the elusive power behind the throne who in 2000 revealed his true colors and assumed full leadership of the country. Finally, albeit only for a shortlived period, the accolade was also applied to Laurent Desire Kabila, the Uganda/Rwanda supported rebel leader who ousted Mobutu Sese Seko wa Zabanga in the former Zaire (presently the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC), but who fell out with his new-breed mentors, Kagame and Museveni, soon after assuming office: “Initially elated at his lightning success, Kabila’s regional patrons were soon disappointed by an unglamorous leader who failed to meet the exacting standards of the New African Political Order” (McNulty 1999:78).

Why was it that only some and not all the leaders who emerged to leadership positions across Africa at this point in time were classified among the new breed? Perhaps one commonality was their youthfulness: Isias, Kagame, Meles, Museveni, and Rawlings were in their late 30s or early 40s when they came to power. By the time the new-breed appellation came into vogue, Rawlings was considerably older than his counterparts, and had held power longer, but he still cut the figure of a dashing, youthful, and dynamic leader, who brooked no nonsense and had turned his country around (Botchway 1998). A second commonality was a strongly nationalist and pan-Africanist ideological position, in a sense inheriting the mantle from the first pan-Africanists, Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba, and Sekou Toure. Third was the disdain that all held for pluralist, competitive politics, and a preference for centralized structures of governance, which harked back to the single-state model of earlier years with cosmetic modification. What was most striking, though, was that whatever their ideological orientation before coming to power, all of them turned to an almost uncritical embrace of free-market Reaganomics. Under the Clinton administration US foreign policy evolved, in the words of a former State Department official, “. . . to
help build open societies with democratic governance and legal systems that protect human rights, because they are more likely to produce stable and equitable economic development.” (Shattuck 2000: 273). In that sense, the new breed were the true disciples of a new religion of globalization, articulated with increasing force after the early 1990s.

In my considered opinion, the new breed’s most significant thread of union and affinity, in terms of their own perceptions of their place in the world and the world’s perception of them, was their directly militarist origins. Given this shared history, there was a predilection to place internal security and national defense above all other concerns, but theirs was ostensibly a militarism of a different kind, informed by a unique and atypical experience. Four of the five had begun as guerrillas, and assumed power via what had hitherto been unconventional methods of taking over African states. Only Rawlings came from the traditional military, although his dramatic double-coup and his emergence from the rank-and-file of the armed forces represented a different modus operandi from the coups that had generally characterized the 1960s and 1970s (First 1970). In this sense, the new breed represented a stark contrast from African leaders in countries like Malawi, Zambia, Namibia and Tanzania who came to power at around the same time by winning elections in pluralist political contests. Towering over both categories, the new and the old, was South Africa’s Nelson Mandela, whose experience as the world’s longest political prisoner in Africa’s last bastion of colonial privilege placed him in a kind of super-breed category. By age, personal experience, and political stature, Mandela was the grandfather of the group.

However, the guru and chief mentor of the group was undoubtedly Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, the guerrilla leader of the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M), who came to power in Uganda in early 1986. When the term new breed was invoked, especially within the context of discussions about the GLR, it was largely in reference to Museveni. He came to symbolize much of what was characterized as new, both within the politics of his own country Uganda, in the Greater Horn region and across the continent as a whole. Throughout the 1990s, he was ranked close to Mandela as a new-style leader of a country that almost all objective observers recognized had been pulled out of the doldrums into which it had been plunged in the 1970s and 1980s by successive civilian and military dictatorships. A 1997 New York Times article written in the aftermath of Mobutu Sese Seko’s removal from power captures the essential elements of this portrayal:

These are heady days for the former guerilla who runs Uganda. He moves with the measured gait and sure gestures of a leader secure in his power and in his vision. It is little wonder. To hear some diplomats and African experts tell it, President Yoweri K. Museveni has started an ideological movement that is reshaping much of Africa, spelling the end of the corrupt, strong-man governments that characterized
the cold-war era. These days, political pundits across the continent are calling Mr. Museveni an African Bismarck. Some people now refer to him as Africa’s “other statesman,” second only to the venerated South African President, Nelson Mandela. [McKinley 1997:3]

Clearly, Museveni stood head and shoulders above his compatriots in Africa in general and within the Greater Horn in particular. Against this background, we can now turn to the question: So, who exactly is Yoweri Kaguta Museveni?

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, the New Breed Guru

There are certain milestones in the formative stages of the life of an individual that will influence them for a considerable period thereafter. In the case of Yoweri Museveni, these are numerous and diverse. A plain-speaking, charismatic and intellectually-versatile leader, some scholars have sought to draw comparisons with other African leaders including Tanzania’s Julius Kambarage Nyerere. Ruled more by pragmatic politics than by ideology, Museveni often takes chalk to blackboard in an attempt to evoke the *mwalimu*-esque style of leadership at which Tanzania’s Julius Kambarage Nyerere excelled. At the same time, Museveni does not suffer fools gladly; both in public and private, he displays abusive and dismissive language, and disparages and dismisses those who disagree with him—traits characteristic of his predecessors, Apolo Milton Obote and Idi Amin. Museveni places considerable stock on the need for “discipline,” which, depending on the context, he deploys to quiet a heckling crowd of university students, or to defuse the criticisms of opposition politicians on the most appropriate direction for government policy. Virtually no distinction is made whether the iron hand is applied to the army or to civilians.

Museveni’s life before the presidency is almost equally divided between the experience of colonial governance and the initial, formative years of independence, which in Uganda were characterized by a sharpening of the colonial divisions based on religion and ethnicity. For a great part of his adult life, Museveni lived outside the country in Tanzania, first as a student and later as a political exile. However, the experience that most directly shaped his political outlook and approach to leadership was the period spent in the Ugandan bush between 1980 and 1985. The bush gave him opportunities to apply the theoretical teachings of his school and college experience and to address political problems that had long plagued Uganda in its political development.

In the following section of the paper, I examine Museveni’s origins and his seemingly unconventional rise to power, in order to understand how he has applied what he learnt to the actual experience of governing Uganda, and to the politics of conflict in the GLR.
Preparing for Presidency

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni was born in the aftermath of World War II, probably in 1945 or 1946; his exact birthdate is unknown. His parents were Esteri Kokundeka and Amos Kaguta, who raised cattle in southwestern Uganda. His name is derived from that of the Baseveni, the Ugandan corruption of the seventh battalion of the King’s African Rifles (KAR), who saw service during World War II and returned as veterans around the time of his birth (Museveni 1997). In high school, he became a born-again fundamentalist Christian, and led the school’s grouping of similarly minded ultrareligionists; at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania he studied under Walter Rodney, became an unreconstructed Marxist, and set up an organization called the University Students’ African Revolutionary Front (USARF). He received the rudiments of guerrilla training and combat in Samora Machel’s FRELIMO in Mozambique in the late 1960s. He returned to college to write his senior thesis on the applicability of Frantz Fanon’s revolutionary violence to postcolonial Africa, having presumably seen the theory applied in practice (ori Amaza, 1998: 235–236).

A stint in Milton Obote’s intelligence service after graduation was cut short in 1971 by Idi Amin’s ascension to power, which forced the young Museveni to join the Ugandan exiles who set up house in Dar es Salaam and elsewhere in Tanzania for the rest of the decade. In 1972, Museveni formed part of the abortive Obote-inspired guerilla attempt to recapture power from Amin. The band was routed, several of its members were captured and killed, and the survivors of the group forced to return to Tanzania. For a brief period thereafter, Museveni lectured at a cooperative college in Moshi, in northern Tanzania, but soon left that job to devote himself full-time to the struggle to oust Amin, under the framework of the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA). The Tanzania-Uganda war in 1979–1980 allowed Museveni to retest his military talents, and he returned to Uganda as the deputy head of the army and minister of defense, serving as vice-chair of the military junta that took power in the wake of the collapse of the second post-Amin civilian government. In the gerrymandered 1980 election, Museveni stood as a presidential candidate, but fled into the bush, protesting massive electoral irregularities and vowing to fight his way back to power.

Uganda’s Ninth President

Museveni’s autobiography reveals an almost messianic focus on his capture of political power and ascendancy to the helm of national politics in Uganda. Within the context of domestic Ugandan politics, Museveni marked out the distinctive mode of leadership he heralded in 1986 by proclaiming a “fundamental change.” In this regard, his bush experience was definitive. The most critical element of that experience was the phenomenon of grassroots democracy, exemplified by a radical reformulation of the system of local
government, providing for the demise of unelected chiefs and the diffusion of administrative power among ten elected officials, known as resistance committees and councils, in popular parlance called RCs (Ddungu 1989). The second platform on which he built a new system was a notion of broad-based government that eschewed the idea of competitive pluralist politics and devised what has come to be known as the no (or zero) party system, under which the NRM—now simply renamed “the Movement”—became the dominant political force (Kasfir 2000). Against the motion of forces around the continent, Museveni repeated the claim made by the founders of single-party states in the early days of African independence: political parties were sectarian, divisive, and bankrupt; moreover, the experience of Uganda gave ample evidence to justify what was considered a temporary ban on pluralist political-party activity.

Internationally, Museveni rocked the Organization of African Unity, a bastion of old-breed politics, by castigating that body for silently looking on as Uganda underwent untold suffering at the hands of successive dictatorial regimes. Able to hobnob with all sides on the political divide, Museveni is great friends with Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi while maintaining close relations with all the British prime ministers since he came to power—from Margaret Thatcher through John Major and up to Tony Blair. The United States counts Uganda among its closest allies in the GLR, but Museveni is also inspired by Fidel Castro and Mahathir Mohammed—the former for his revolutionary credentials in Cuba and abroad, the latter for the economic miracle he effected in Malaysia.

In sum, Museveni can be described as a conundrum of paradoxes: he is a dictator with some democratic tendencies, and a market-reformed Marxist. Each of these character traits vies for expression and supremacy.7 As his written works on political theory and practice illustrate, Museveni also has aspirations to intellectualism, even if the appellation “philosopher-king,” once applied to him by Ali Mazrui, may be stretching it a bit too far (Mazrui 1987). Many observers liken him to Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela, but closer scrutiny places him farther down the totem pole. Indeed, even with respect to those he regards as his most implacable enemies—his predecessors Idi Amin and Milton Obote—he shares many characteristics. With Amin, it is an affection for matters military, friendship with Muammar Quadaffi, and an unflagging belief in the efficacy of military action to solve virtually every political problem. With Obote, the relationship is more complex: Obote is both mentor and nemesis, and the two men stand in roughly an “Oedipal” relationship. Even as Museveni has tried to mark distance from Obote, aspects of his politics closely resemble Obote’s.

Museveni, like Obote before him, believes in the supremacy of his political organization (the UPC) and his own ability to maneuver the political elite. Both men relied extensively on the military to resolve essentially political disputes. Both strongly believed in individual destiny (Ogot 1999:223), and have demonstrated this—Obote in seeking the presidency for a second time, and Museveni in pursuing a war that on first perception
appeared a futile and doomed endeavour (Ingham 1994). When Museveni looks in the mirror, he must see Obote: it is not surprising that even as he repeats so many of Obote’s political mistakes, he evokes Obote’s image and persona in futile support of the claim that he actually differs from him. But both these men’s Achilles’ heel, the deepest vulnerability they share, is a disdain for, and fear of, oppositional politics. Thus, in the 1960s, Obote moved against both the right and left-wings of his party—the Uganda Peoples’ Congress (UPC)—in a bid to consolidate his power, just as Museveni did against the ‘traditionalists’ urging the restoration of a political monarchy in Buganda, and the reformists in the contemporary Movement. We shall return to this point when we examine the issue of conflict within the Ugandan context.

Central to Museveni’s worldview is the primacy of security over virtually any other public good. On the first anniversary of the NRA/M’s assumption of power, Museveni gave a speech in which he attacked the incipient rebels, cattle-rafters and “tribalists” who were causing problems in various parts of the country. In that address, he provided his most succinct explanation for placing security concerns above all else:

> We are, therefore, continuing to strengthen our defence forces: to neglect doing so would be like exposing meat when there are dangerous carnivores around. Remember the story of the boy who took a lump of meat out in the courtyard! A carnivorous bird (kamunye) swooped down on him and not only took the meat but left his fingers bleeding. The boy came crying to his father, who told him, “It was your fault: you should have carried a spear so when the kamunye came to grab the meat, it would have impaled itself on the spear.” Uganda’s riches are very tempting. There are many kamunyes with their mouths watering for Uganda’s coffee, gold, timber, skins, hides and other riches. Certain interests do not want stability here. Stability here will mean that there are no longer any possibilities for smuggling. (Museveni 2000:22)

In certain respects, this viewpoint may be acceptable given Uganda’s turbulent history and the problems of a security nature that continue to plague the country. Rebel groups, particularly in the north, have wreaked havoc on civilians, cattle rustling in the pastoral part of the northeast has disrupted everyday life there, and the upsurge in regional wars have all been given as justification for this approach to Uganda’s security concerns. Consequently, defense spending has grown to overshadow any other sector as a proportion of national expenditure. Even attempts by donor governments to cap military spending have been unsuccessful. As a consequence, Uganda under Museveni has built a formidable military machine, one that has insinuated itself into nearly all aspects of national social and political life. Museveni’s belief in the military is demonstrated by not only his continued
leadership of the army [as a lieutenant general], but also his recourse to the military in dealing with essentially political and economic affairs, such as elections, taxation, and smuggling. The induction into the army and rapid promotion of his son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, is a further manifestation of this belief. But for the fact that Museveni is not a military man in the formal sense, or that there are periodic elections and a functioning legislature, Uganda would qualify to be called a military government. Perhaps the description quasi-military would be most apt.

Numerous other reforms have been introduced to the Ugandan body politic, the economy and the overall context within which civil society and the state operate over the last decade and a half. Such reforms have included affirmative action for women and other disadvantaged groups, access to primary education, and the struggle against HIV/AIDS [Tripp 2001]. These developments marked Museveni out from prior leaders and led many to believe that there was something fresh and new afoot in Uganda after so many years of turmoil and abject dislocation and discord. Thus commenced the praise for Museveni as a new breed of leader. Praise for him has continued, despite the fact that domestically and within the GLR an upsurge in armed conflict has coincided with this remarkable about face in the image of Uganda that was previously regarded as the “sick man” of Africa. Appreciating this paradox is the point that I wish to now turn, by examining the phenomenon of conflict and its expression within the region generally and in Uganda in particular.

The Nature of Conflict in the Great Lakes and Uganda: From the Macro to the Micro

At the end of the 1980s, Africa had a refugee population that far outstripped its numbers of internally displaced persons. Conflicts that stretched from Mozambique and Angola in the south to Somalia in the Horn and Liberia in the west had forced many people to flee their homes for safety across borders. Ironically, a decade later, internally displaced persons far outnumber refugees, as the nature and character of conflict has undergone metamorphosis in tandem with political developments and within the region and in the character of African states [Cheru 2002:194]. Despite the political transitions that have taken place in many African countries, many countries remain embroiled in conflicts of varying scale and intensity. In this context, it is supremely ironic that the four new breed leaders all went to war with each other: Isias against Meles over a border dispute, and Museveni against Kagame in an argument over the control of political developments and resources in the occupied territories of the DRC. To better understand these developments, we turn our lens on the situation in the Great Lakes region.
The Situation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa

It would be absurd to blame the whole gamut of conflict in Uganda, or any of the other countries in the region, or indeed the GLR as a whole, on the machinations of Museveni, Kagame, or Kabila the first—or indeed, any of the leaders who have involved themselves, directly or by proxy, in the conflagrations afflicting the region. Such would be committing the folly of placing too much emphasis on the place of the individual in the context of social evolution and political development. To determine and assess the factors that have fueled the conflicts in the region (Cheru 2002:196–198), one must invariably review colonial history (Kulumba 2000), postcolonial developments, and the political economy specific to each country. Also important is the international dimension. Following the termination of the Cold War and the collapse of communism, the end-of-imperialism thesis has come into vogue, and it curtly dismisses external explanations for political developments within the continent. Post–Cold War African conflicts may appear to have indigenous roots, but it would be grossly naïve and fundamentally incorrect to conclude that the problem is essentially domestic. To appreciate this point, one need only look at the struggle over the DRC’s mineral and other sources of wealth; moreover, none of the countries involved in the war was a significant producer of arms, which at a minimum pointed to an external dimension to the issue [Reyntjens 2001:312].

The Great Lakes region of Africa is today perhaps the most strife-ridden territory in Africa. It is vivid testimony to this fact that the region produced the conflict in the DRC which is Africa’s first equivalent to what on any other continent would be regarded as a world war, involving no less than seven countries from within the region and beyond. The GLR is afflicted by both high- and low-intensity conflict, with the DRC, Burundi, and Uganda exemplifying the former, Rwanda standing somewhere in the middle, while Kenya largely exemplifies the latter. In Burundi, a civil war continues to boil and thwart attempts at a peaceful settlement, despite the gallant efforts of Nelson Mandela as mediator. Rwanda is plagued by the continuing specter of genocide, the sporadic attacks of the Interahamwe, and a host of proxy rebels based in the DRC.

In Kenya, an election at the end of 2002 brought to power a coalition of opposition groups, marking the termination of forty years’ dominance by KANU, the party that had dominated government since independence. Nevertheless, the ethnopolitical attacks that shook the country in the early 1990s demonstrate that devious political machination can foster a situation of conflict, even in the most stable of contexts [Klopp 2001]. Although not featured on our “high/low” list, it is also necessary to keep watch over Tanzania. While being largely spared the turmoil and tensions of its more conflicted neighbors, Tanzania has nevertheless witnessed some developments (as with the case of political tensions within Zanzibar, and between the island and the mainland) that is cause for some concern. In many respects Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) continues to operate under the single-party
structures of old, squashing legitimate efforts by the opposition to restrain it. Finally, although the Sudan is not considered part of the GLR, the conflict in the south of the country has significant implications for the process of peace in the wider Great Lakes region, especially in Uganda, a more or less direct protagonist in Sudanese affairs.

It is not the intention of this paper to exhaustively examine the root causes of this upsurge in conflicts—both latent and overt. However, it is necessary to point out some of the generic problems that are their cause. In the first instance it is necessary to come to grips with the essentially violent roots and structure of the African state. Built on imperial violence and sustained by it, African states can be described as national security states par excellence. This is a colonial legacy, but it was extended and brought to a head following independence. The degree to which each state has dealt with violence has varied, but the roots and contemporary manifestations of the problem are manifest in countries as varied as Nigeria, Lesotho, and the Central African Republic. Second, the thawing Cold War, which saw dictators like Siad Barre in Somalia and Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire lose their grip over their countries, has placed African states under increased pressure. Some states have quite literally imploded. Coupled with a dramatic deterioration in economic conditions worsened by structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and heightened appeals to ethnic solidarity, the general rise in conflict in Africa, and specifically in the GLR, has multiple explanations. Finally, significant issues relating to the quest for resources—exemplified most explicitly by the conflicts in the Sudan and the DRC—also need to be taken into account (Montague 2002). Against this background, we need to examine the contribution of the new-breed leadership, and specifically of President Museveni to this situation.

The Museveni Persona and Conflict Generation

Is it merely coincidental that the conflicts in the GLR began to erupt in the late 1980s, and particularly in the wake of Museveni’s capture of state power in Uganda? In my view, the answer is both yes and no. The conflicts in Sudan and Burundi predated Museveni’s ascendancy, and those in Rwanda and the DRC could be said to have been latent, though both countries have experienced war in earlier periods. Thus, reasons endemic to each country can be offered to explain what appears to be a pattern; however, it is also clear that many of the conflicts are traceable to a combination of Museveni’s vision for a closer integration of the region and a reliance on a militaristic method of achieving that integration. Museveni has long been a pan-Africanist who regularly curses the “foolish arbitrariness” of Africa’s borders and urges for the development of larger markets. He often attacks the idea of an Africa joined (or divided) in terms of the traditional linguistic anglophone, francophone, or lusophone categorizations, and urges the creation of what he has described as a Bantu or afrophone category.
Unlike Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta—pan-Africanists of old—Museveni brings to the discussion an essentially militaristic and opportunistic vision of the process of integration. Starting with the invasion of Rwanda by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1990, this vision has played itself out through his support for the RPF up to and beyond the Habyalimana genocide. While Uganda’s role in Rwanda is the one that most readily comes to mind, we must not forget that Rwanda was not Museveni’s first port of call. Indeed, on coming to power, Museveni began by first looking east: he supported dissident elements confronting what was then still a one-party regime in Kenya (Khadiagala 1993:244–245). The result was a series of border skirmishes that were quelled only when it became apparent that Daniel arap Moi, president of Kenya, would be no easy adversary, particularly if resort was made to the closure of the border, landlocked Uganda’s only lifeline to the sea. Needless to say, for some time, the Museveni model attracted considerable support in Kenya, particularly in the opposition and among the youth who considered him a dynamic and charismatic leader and the harbinger of reform in the region generally, and in Kenya.

Then there is the conflict in the south of Sudan. To be fair, Museveni is not the first Ugandan leader to provide support to the southern Sudanese fighting for increased autonomy. Support for their movement has been a consistent element in Ugandan foreign policy since independence. All Ugandan governments without exception have given moral and material support to the SPLA and its predecessors. Nevertheless, Uganda’s support for the SPLA became much more prominent under the Museveni regime—a fact that coincided with a more active Western (especially US) interest in fighting what is considered to be the scourge of Islamic fundamentalism as perpetrated by the Omar Bashir regime in Khartoum. Needless to say, such support has brought with it considerable negative consequences, which heightened the conflict within Uganda. Virtually since the Museveni regime came to power, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) have wreaked havoc in northern Uganda, often with the active support of the Sudanese government (Oloka-Onyango 1997). Despite an attempt at forging a truce, the process initially took off in fits and starts, and stalemated while the two countries continued the support for each other’s dissidents. Furthermore, the conflict has serious implications for a peaceful resolution of tensions within Uganda, vividly demonstrating the connection between the regional and the local.

And finally, what about the war in the DRC? Few Zairöis or Congolese of any political persuasion lamented the departure of General Mobutu from politics, but they did not necessarily applaud what emerged to replace him. Aside from the official reasons given, the Congolese intervention reflected an interest on the part of Uganda and Rwanda to have a definitive stake in the evolution of political developments within the DRC. Whether or not such an interest was justified is debatable; however, Uganda and Rwanda
insisted on the legitimacy of their troops’ presence in the DRC and offered numerous, albeit varying, explanations for it. This interest went beyond mere oversight and evolved into direct control; it offers some explanation as to why Uganda and Rwanda fell out with Kabila. Other actors’ support of the Congolese government—including interventions by Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique—added significantly to the tensions. One could say that the DRC conflict pitted the new breed directly against the old.

The issue of resources gives some indication for the metamorphosis in the reasons that Uganda and Rwanda gave for being in the DRC: by 2003, when they had withdrawn, there was virtually no connection between the reasons supplied for first going there and the excuses given for remaining. Eventually, the dispute was partly resolved through the Lusaka Accords, which called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of all foreign troops as a framework for sustaining peace. Both Uganda and Rwanda actively continued to violate and thwart the compact at every turn, despite their ostensible commitment to the accord. This and other conflicts were partly resolved through the Lusaka Accords, which called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of all foreign troops as a framework for sustaining peace. Both countries actively continued to violate and thwart the compact at every turn, despite their ostensible commitment to the accord. That these allies set upon each other at the infamous Kisangani clashes in 1998 and 1999 adds another dimension to the issue, but does not depart from the fundamental point, that the interests at stake in these countries’ involvement in the DRC had virtually nothing to do with those of the Congolese peoples.

What is important for the present analysis is that Museveni’s approach to the DRC illustrates the essentially militaristic framework upon which his calculations were based. Moreover, that militarism was tinged with a high degree of arrogance and disdain for the DRC government and its allies, and for the international community and its mechanisms, with Museveni even describing the members of the U.N. peacekeeping mission to the Ituri region as military tourists. Such qualities may have been an asset in a guerrilla war, but they proved costly in the full-scale regional war that the DRC became. Some scholars and activists have applauded the war for forcing the issue of the viability of Congolese statehood squarely onto the table. According to this line of argument, the confrontational politics of the new breed should be regarded as positive, in that it brought to the fore the contradiction that is the DRC, considered by many to be a country only in name. However, the sheer arrogance of countries which should have learned from the painful lesson of their own histories that external intervention can never be the panacea to internal problems, defeats the imagination. The eventual withdrawal of Uganda and Rwanda brought into bold relief the fact that military adventures of the kind seen in the DRC can be brutal and bloody. Uganda and Rwanda are prime examples to demonstrate that self-determination cannot be imposed on a country from without; it must be a home-grown process. But the DRC case is made all the more painful in the wake of the plunder and pillage committed by state agents of the two countries. In the final analysis, the developments recounted above point to several related conclusions about the place and role of Museveni vis-à-vis the conflicts in the GLR. While each of the situations we have referenced is characterized by its own specific history and circumstances,
Museveni has loomed large in every one of them. This might be the coincidence of history, but such a conclusion ignores the fact that Museveni has designed the most aggressive foreign military policy for the region than any of his predecessors and any other leaders in the history of the region. That policy has led to regional conflicts assuming a different character, with a much more heightened degree of overt external intervention than before. Second, the political options to the resolution of these crises have been deemed secondary. Thus, an inordinate degree of emphasis has been placed on the use of force to end the conflicts. For a considerable period, various accords that were entered into over these conflicts were viewed merely as stop-gap measures to a resolution that would ultimately be a military one. This is what happened in Rwanda, and in the DRC, despite the political settlements eventually arising from both conflicts. It continues to be the case with the Sudan. However, these are developments outside Uganda; it is necessary to return to an examination of the issue of conflict within the domestic Ugandan situation in order to appreciate how much Museveni has influenced it.

Revisiting the Domestic Dimension

To understand the international posture of Museveni, it is necessary to look inward. Museveni’s approach to regional issues is essentially an extension of his approach to domestic politics. If we turn our lens inward once again, we see a clear pattern at play. As has already been observed, Museveni’s verve and dynamism certainly contributed to the radical changes in Uganda’s body politic. However, even as we praise these changes, many of them explain the cause and the continuation of Uganda’s internal conflicts. Despite all the positive developments that have been achieved in Uganda during his tenure, the most serious problem confronting the country is the assault on political freedom and reconstruction and the absence of enduring peace. The broad-based arrangement that has been the hallmark of the Movement system is the starkest example. Commencing as a voluntary “gentleman’s” agreement, the Movement was initially thought to be only a temporary measure, which would pave the way for a pluralist competitive system. Aspirations for all levels of political office could be asserted only on the basis of individual merit, rather than political party affiliation. In this respect, it was believed that vying for political office would be shorn of the ethnic, religious, and other sectarian considerations seen to have marred electoral processes under previous multiparty systems in Uganda.

Over time, the reasons for the Movement’s continued existence and the justification for outlawing legitimate opposition have evolved [Kasfir 2000:68–75]. In the discussions that led to a new constitution, the Movement was elevated to a system of government, to vie against the alternatives of a multiparty system and the single-party state. While the latter was explicitly outlawed, the two remaining systems were eventually incorporated into Uganda’s 1995 Constitution. The catch was that the choice of
Which system Uganda should pursue would be confirmed by referendum, with the additional proviso that during the subsistence of one system, the other would be held in abeyance. A referendum held in 2000 kept the Movement system in place, at least until another referendum, scheduled to be held in 2004.20

What have the above developments meant? Essentially, that the Movement, ostensibly conceived and designed as a temporary structure to pave the way for pluralist politics, evolved into a permanent structure of the state; however, the process of evolution has led to the abandonment of the original elements of the Movement—such as its broad-based nature, and the notion that individual merit would be the basis of electoral politics—as well as continued suppression and the destruction of any attempts at building genuinely pluralist political competition in Uganda. How has this been so? First, by the suppression of political opposition on the grounds that such activity is constitutionally prohibited; but more importantly, by exempting the Movement from the sanctions that have been put in place for regulating the activities of political parties: the Movement has become whatever Museveni decides that it should be. Thus, a recent legislation, the Political Organizations Act of 2002, disallowed parties from performing virtually any of the activities typically expected of parties; at the same time, it strengthened the Movement’s hegemony over political activity [Human Rights Watch 1999:3–4].

Against a background of the shifting sands of political competition in Uganda, it is not surprising that the most serious test of Museveni’s claim to “newbreedism” emerged within the context of the electoral struggles for the presidency in 1996 and 2001. Tested by the challenge of electoral politics, Museveni has performed badly, moreover in contests in which formal, organized opposition is effectively proscribed. In the 1996 election, opposition candidate Paulo Ssemogerere did not pose a serious challenge to Museveni, but the level of violence, overt intimidation by the security forces, and the gerrymandering of the polls, demonstrated a disturbing level of intolerance to the challenge. In the 2001 elections, the challenge came from within. Museveni’s personal doctor and bush-war compatriot, Kizza Besigye broke Movement ranks by declaring his candidacy for the presidency. Museveni’s response was vitriolic: it ranged from accusations that Besigye was a traitor to allegations about his HIV/AIDS status, aside from the many attempts to simply block his candidacy. But what was truly discouraging were the levels of overt violence and intimidation that mirrored the highly discredited elections of 1980. The Besigye candidacy clearly touched a raw nerve because it finally demonstrated that the Movement system was merely an edifice erected for the accommodation of Museveni’s continued retention of power.

At the beginning of 2003, Uganda was gripped by the twin announcements of an intended opening of the organizational space to allow political parties to organize and compete. At the same time, in far-reaching proposals
on constitutional reform, Museveni recommended lifting the constitutional provision that stipulates that a president can stand for election for only two terms. Rather than seeking an amendment that would allow a third term, as was attempted in Zambia, Malawi, Zanzibar, and elsewhere, Museveni recommended that term limits be removed altogether. Furthermore, the recommendation for the “opening” of political space was again to be subjected to a referendum, scheduled for 2004. In sum, what appeared to be reforms in the political arena have actually turned out to be further closure.

What is clear from the foregoing is that the problem of contemporary Uganda is even larger than the absence of a viable opposition and the deliberate efforts by the state power to squash expressions of legitimate opposition. The ills of “bigmanism” (Tangri & Mwenda 2001), including corruption, ethnicity, and patronage, have started to make the Museveni regime look little different from the predecessors he so vigourously condemns:

> While the Museveni regime may have performed much better than a rather dismal African average, its props are not so different from many other African regimes. At the very centre of power in Uganda one finds a very high concentration of Banyankole elements, and a fair number of family members. . . . One sees generous patronage being paid out to supporters of the regime, particularly prominent multi-partyists who defect to the movement. One observes a casual attitude to the rule of law, as in Museveni’s dispatch of the UPDF to Congo without an enabling law from the Parliament. (Clark 2000:16)

The continuity of the old is also manifest if one examines the military conflicts in the northern and western parts of the country—conflicts that have subsisted for a considerable period of ebb and flow throughout the Museveni era. While their roots and causes vary from the purely opportunistic to serious questions of ethnic marginalization and discrimination, the mode of approaching their resolution, which has largely been to rely on military methods of suppression, has yet to produce enduring results. Starting in late 2002, a flurry of activity involving a new, two-pronged approach to the crisis represented by the LRA began. This comprised the fist of military might (code-named Operation Iron Fist) and the olive branch of peace-talks, but it emphasized the former. To conclude, neither in handling domestic politics, nor in resolving internal conflict, has Museveni demonstrated that he is a leader of a fundamentally different caliber from that of his predecessors, even if he is certainly more sophisticated and adept than they were. What is of more concern is that he had the opportunity, the skill, and the intellectual capacity to have made a difference.
A final word needs to be said about the nature of the relationships among new-breed leaders like Museveni, Western powers, and the international financial institutions (IFIs), like the World Bank and the IMF, that have given new-breed leaders support. All the new-breed leaders have seen significantly increased aid-flows to their countries, accompanied by much praise for their economic management skills. They have been lauded for the dexterity with which they have handled the often painful prescriptions that outsiders have made to effect such transformations. In particular, Uganda's adoption of free-market reforms encompassing economic liberalization, privatization, and the reform of public enterprise has earned accolades from many in the West. Long favored by Western powers, Museveni thus gets away with actions that would not be tolerated were they to be committed by an old-breed leader like Daniel arap Moi, for example. Throughout the 1990s, there were more political prisoners in Uganda than in Kenya, Uganda was involved in many more conflict-generating activities than Kenya, and the political system in Uganda was manifestly less conducive to the solution of conflict in Uganda than it was in Kenya: "Uganda is a more divided country today than it was when the NRM came to power" (Hauser 1999:635).

And yet, the deference that Museveni enjoys from Western powers makes him all the more confident. Enamoured by a security complex which is prepared to support Museveni despite his manifestly undemocratic and illiberal tendencies, international capital and Western governments have contributed to the consolidation of conditions in which conflicts in the region can only thrive. That Museveni has managed to resist the virtually worldwide equation of market reforms with pluralist (i.e., multiparty politics) democracy shows Museveni's dexterity in working the international arena. However, it is also a stark illustration of the true goals and the duplicity in the application of standards of democratic governance by governments like those of the United States and other Western regimes which lay claim to upholding a new type of governance model for Africa in the post-Cold War epoch.

This scenario is compounded by the fact that Africa continues to rank low in U.S. foreign-policy priorities, and is only marginally more important with respect to the other Western powers, with the possible exception of some of the ex-colonial governments. While the Clinton Administration certainly made more overtures to Africa, the Bush Administration is less inclined to do so, unless security or economic interests are directly affected (Schraeder, 2001). In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, this affliction has assumed even larger proportions, as the United States concentrates on building a broad coalition of states allied in the fight against terrorism (Sankore 2002).

Support for the "war against terrorism" has become a handy excuse for governments around the world freely to assault opposition elements of
varying kinds. Thus, when the Ugandan government recently closed the The Monitor, an opposition newspaper, in a high-handed action reminiscent of the Amin and second Obote eras, spokespersons for the state were not shy to cite terrorism in justification. (Economist 2002) Objections to the action that were voiced by the U.S. embassy in Uganda were simply scoffed at. The inclusion of Uganda in President Bush’s African tour of 2003 was linked to Uganda’s strong support for the U.S. war in Iraq and Uganda’s signature on the treaty exempting U.S. soldiers from the application of the International Criminal Court.

In short, what this kind of support from the West encourages is precisely the behavior that such countries claim to detest in leaders like Mobutu Sese Seko and Daniel arap Moi. Indeed, even though the United States was reportedly displeased about the impasse in the war in the DRC, and particularly about the fight between Rwanda and Uganda, this alleged displeasure did not manifest itself in any change in support for the Museveni regime. Repudiation was mild or nonexistent. In many respects, therefore, Western powers and the IFIs bear considerable responsibility for nurturing the new breed, who have emerged to play a prominent role in generating and directing conflict in the region. They have done this by either turning a blind eye to the acts of blatant aggression, or by being complicit in their soft treatment of the new breed. Their actions reflect a feeling of guilt for the sins of the Cold War, or the racist and paternalistic belief that Africa “is different” and actually requires the type of governance exercised by leaders like Museveni. The considerable assistance that Western powers have extended to the Ugandan government has thus operated to consolidate dictatorship and heighten conflict, rather than to create conditions for promoting democratic governance and the nonconflictual resolution of disputes.

Conclusion

The optimism that greeted the arrival of the new breed has long since dissipated, though some people believe the new breed can still offer genuinely different solutions on the African predicament. The bitter fact is that the new breed is no longer new: many have been around for at least a decade, and some, like Museveni for even more. Although they have submitted themselves to electoral processes, these are in circumstances where the monopoly of the ruling party or movement is in little danger of dissolution. Longevity itself may not be a major problem; however, it comes with other costs, including a tendency for increased corruption, less accountability, and a situation conducive for the development of conflict. Furthermore, if we recall that this was one of the main grievances that African peoples had against the Old Breed of its leaders, then we have truly come full circle. Coupled with the bigman syndrome, the suppression of viable political alternatives, and the contraction of political space for the development of
alternative visions to governance (a situation apparent in many of the new-breed regimes), the new breed takes the final step to emulating the old: from two legs bad, four legs better, to four legs, better; two legs, best! Museveni’s current quest for an extension of what will be a 20 year stay in office clearly illustrates this metamorphosis.

If nothing else, the old breed of leadership kept most conflicts at fairly low levels. While the new breed came to power through violence [in Museveni’s words to “end the use of violence in politics”], violence remains very much a part of their strategy. They apply it through various means, overt and covert. But it is precisely because of violence that the countries of Africa have undergone such a traumatic experience. At a minimum, the new breed should have learned this lesson of history. Given that they have not, Okot p’Bitek’s description of Africa’s independence leaders in an essay written in the mid-1960s can still be said to apply. We have indeed come full circle:

And those who have
Fallen into things
Throw themselves into soft beds
But the hip bones of the voters
Grow painful
Sleeping on the same earth
They slept
Before Uhuru! (p’Bitek 1972: 110)

NOTES

1. Without engaging in the debate about definitions, by the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa we are concerned with the following countries: Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Uganda.

2. A recent domestic opinion poll by an American election monitoring body, the International Foundation for Election Systems, stated that 93 percent of Ugandans approved of Museveni’s performance as president (Kakande 2000:3).

3. The assumption of power by Museveni’s NRA/M in 1986 was only the second occasion on which a guerrilla movement had successfully removed an incumbent government from office via military struggle: the first was the case of Chad in 1981.

4. Nyerere was named Mwalimu, the Swahili word for ‘teacher,’ because his roots were in the school system, and he had great oratorical and literary skills.

5. Many observers argue that this event marked Museveni’s final split from Obote, whom he accused of mismanaging the invasion, and of failing to deliver on promises of materiel and supplies.

6. There may be some controversy about the numbering of Uganda’s presidents since Paulo Muwanga—the head of the Military Commission of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) who effectively ruled Uganda from June, 1979 to December, 1980 was never styled as president. In order of tenure, they have been: Sir Edward Mutesa II (1963–1966), Apolo Milton

7. In the words of Crawford Young, "Uganda in the Museveni years is one of the most intriguing instances of the contradictions embedded in the broad but uneven African trend towards political and economic liberalization" (Young 2001:207).

8. With the onset of September 11, 2001, and the rise of the security-and-antiterrorism paradigm as the dominant ideology in Western governmental thinking, the tune is changing. Thus, in a recent visit to Uganda, the Executive Director of the United Nations Development Program, Mark Malloch Brown, was quoted as expressing support for the government’s defense spending in language that directly related to the above paradigm: "From a broader perspective of insecurity in the Great Lakes Region and from the fact that Uganda is a success story in many areas such as poverty eradication, AIDS, health and others, it is entirely appropriate that Uganda gets sound defense. Uganda needs a well equipped force to fight terrorism" http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200211150030.html, accessed on December 17, 2003.


10. Until recently, the Ugandan government had always denied having given any backing to the RPF, arguing that they had simply “deserted” from the Ugandan military; however, in a fit of pique following the clashes with Rwanda in Kisangani, Museveni made the first formal admission of support.

11. Mamdani argues that the RPF was born much more out of the increased marginalization that Rwandese refugees experienced within the framework of both the NRA, as well as within the wider Ugandan social context (2001:159–184.) While this may be true, it certainly does not detract from the fact that the Ugandan government gave its active support to the RPF—a fact admitted by Museveni in the context of his dispute with President Kagame that received considerable space in the local and international press (Reed 1996).

12. A truce between the two countries was reached in 2002, leading to a restoration of diplomatic relations, severed in 1995. Whenever there is an upsurge in the level of conflict, Uganda claims that Sudan has resumed its support of the LRA. See, Khartoum Denies Aiding LRA, New Vision, November 15, 2002.


14. With the release of the U.N. report on the plundering of the Congo, the Rwanda-Uganda invasion assumed a different dimension. Interestingly, only President Kabila of the DRC took any serious steps against those members of his government named in the report.


16. Amin’s attack on Tanzania in 1978, which involved the occupation of the “Kagera Salient,” was intended to divert attention from an army mutiny and the erosion of central power in Kampala.

17. Nyerere—perhaps the most pan-Africanist of the leaders in the GLR—never considered the Ugandan intervention as part of a program of Tanzanian expansionism. Indeed, once it appeared that this may have been the subtext to the invasion, the Tanzanians promptly withdrew.

18. Indeed, in the DRC, the ramifications of the Rwanda-Uganda intervention are manifest in the continued operations of the various rebel armies left in the wake of the withdrawal of the foreign troops (Lacey 2002).
19. In this respect, Mamdani’s observation is telling: “The longer Uganda remains involved in regional conflicts, the more that involvement is likely to influence internal developments” (2002:504). My view is that internal developments forced Uganda to become more intimately involved in the region.

20. The referendum was boycotted by opposition parties and registered a low turnout. There is some dispute as to what the boycott meant (Bratton & Lambright 2001; Therkildsen 2002).

21. Thus, the U.S. government is reportedly concerned about the rising incidence of HIV/AIDS among African armies within the overall framework of its strategic concerns about stability on the continent (Cauvin 2002).

22. The United States canceled Uganda’s involvement in the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)—a military-training program that was designed to provide African armies an effective domestic response to local crises.

23. It is ironic, but also consistent with this scenario, that the new-breed leaders began to suppress internal opposition and to fall out with one another; hence the Ethiopia-Eritrea war, and the Uganda/Rwanda clashes in the DRC. Political opposition in all four countries has been increasingly more harassed. See BBC World News 2001b.

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